(1) Over 1,000 merchant/accounts from the digital/third-party partner sector can be transferred to PXP if Wirecard's TPA business – as the prosecution alleges in its indictment – ​​"never" existed.

(2) Embezzlement of TPA proceeds via the shell company Al Alam Solution to generate endowment capital for the Levantine Foundation
In the various detention review proceedings, the defense pointed to the embezzlement of third-party partner proceeds that Bellenhaus committed via the shell company Al Alam Solution, based in the British Virgin Islands and holding an account at the Bank of Singapore, to generate endowment capital for his Levantine Foundation.  

The key points here are:

Attorney Dr. Stegemann, defense counsel for the accused Bellenhaus, described in detail in his written submission of November 26, 2020, that, why, and how Marsalek and Bellenhaus established shadow and parallel structures. On page 2 of this submission (EA III-1-II p. 339), it states:

"According to my client's recollection, in 2010 he was instructed by the co-defendant Jan Marsalek to establish several offshore companies and to open an external bank account (outside the Wirecard Group) for each of them. ...Furthermore, from my client's current perspective, the account outside of Wirecard was intended to make it more difficult for auditors to verify the transparency of the original sources of funds and the liquidity situation of the companies."  

And regarding the establishment of the BVI company Al Alam Solution, which was part of this shadow and embezzlement structure (EA III-1-II p. 340):

“My client then also appointed a newly established BVI company, this time named Al Alam Solution (the name of the TPA and Wirecard partner in Dubai was Al Alam Solution Provider), via an Incorporation Service (Heritage Trust Group Ltd.).”  

Continuing with the embezzlement of TPA revenues on page 3 below:

“In 2015, Jan Marsalek informed my client that payments would be made by an acquirer from China (the acquirer's name, according to my client's recollection, was Globebill Company). Part of the revenue was to be deposited into Al Alam Solution Provider's operating account at Wirecard Bank and, according to my client's recollection, paid directly to the acquiring merchants. The remainder, in the case of BVI Ge Gesellschaft, was to be deposited into a savings account. At the end of 2015, various acquiring payments were indeed made to the accounts at Bank of Singapore and Wirecard Bank.” (Emphasis added)

This written submission establishes that third-party partner revenues were paid out via Globebill to the shell company Al Alam Solution and embezzled. This assertion is supported by the fact that large payments from Globebill were indeed received in the Al Alam Solution Provider account at Wirecard Bank, account number 60757, during the same period.

The Public Prosecutor's Office  

To clarify the facts of the case, it would have been essential to forensically trace the payment back to its origin. This would have revealed the extent to which revenues from Wirecard's third-party partner business were transferred to the shadow company Al Alam Solution and how much revenue was embezzled. To clarify the profit distribution within the gang, it would have been imperative to examine Al Alam Solution's account at the Bank of Singapore. This would have revealed who profited from the embezzled funds and to what extent, as well as which revenue payments were processed through the shadow structure. Investigations into the acquirer Globebill would also have been necessary to further clarify the background of the payments. The defense had already pointed out the urgent need for these investigative measures in a written submission to the Higher Regional Court of Munich dated June 9, 2021. The public prosecutor's office stated the following in its opinion of June 28, 2021 (EA II-3-X p. 83):

“Especially for countries from the Anglo-American region…”  

"Especially for countries within the Anglo-American legal system, such as Singapore, even investigative measures that would be unproblematic in Germany require extensive explanations and evidence of a crime that was committed and for the processing of which the relevant account was used. The defense's unsubstantiated suspicion is simply insufficient." (Emphasis added)

To this day  

Nothing has been done to further clarify the facts of the case. No investigation has even been initiated against the accused Bellenhaus in connection with this matter, although he is accused of embezzling payments from the  

Wirecard's third-party partner division has admitted to using payment flows from the acquirer Globebill to generate endowment capital for its Levantine Foundation.  

Evidence of the transfer of third-party business to UAB Alternative Payments

The files reveal that Wirecard's third-party business was also transferred to UAB Alternative Payments. An email from Iman Tarakji dated June 16, 2015, indicates that a significant portion of the volume of Wirecard's third-party partner Al Alam was transferred to UAB Alternative Payments, based in Vilnius (EA III-1-IV p. 698).  

“Dear Stephan,
I hope everything is well!
As I had advised Oliver last week we have moved a significant part of our processing volume to our subsidiary UAB Alternative Pay-ments in Vilnius, Lithuania. UAB-AP is a regulated financial service provider in accordance with the European Union PSD regulatory framework-work. Moving forward we will of course still be supporting our clients and partners at the high level of quality of service you are used to. However, the new regulated entity allows us to operate payment services out of the Euro-pean Union and thus provide you with even better and more comprehensive services for that territory.” (emphasis added)
If Bellenhaus  

When Bellenhaus claims in his interrogation of February 7, 2022, that the email was intended to create a "storyline" for the auditors "for compliance reasons" in order to attract more European partners.  

The claim that the necessary documentation could be presented, but this was ultimately not implemented (EA III-1-IV, p. 666), represents a further attempt to cover up the embezzlement. Based on the available information, there is strong evidence that UAB Alternative Payments was indeed established to process credit card payments from Wirecard's third-party partners. Bellenhaus stated in connection with the establishment of Finolita that Senjo's TPA business was to be processed through Finolita. He himself obtained the Finolita license. However, UAB Alternative Payments was then established practically simultaneously. The UBO (Uniform Administrator) was Wolfgang Kring, a close friend of Bellenhaus.

In detail:  

In his written statement of February 3, 2022, Bellenhaus stated that Mr. Ley had commissioned him in 2015 to find a European e-money license for the TPA partners. He explained that, in his view, this was done for "anticipatory compliance reasons" (EA III-1-IV p. 53):

"Finolita came under the influence of Henry O'Sullivan around 2016. Around 2015, Burkhard Ley commissioned me to find a European e-money license for our TPA partners for what I perceived as 'anticipatory' compliance reasons."

Bellenhaus  

Bellenhaus then goes on to explain that he had a contact at a Lithuanian law firm who had arranged the purchase of a license for him. The law firm in question is likely ECOVIS ProventusLaw (SoBa XII-4-2, p. 378). Bellenhaus then suggested to Ley and Marsalek that they buy the license themselves, which Mr. Ley rejected. Marsalek then told Bellenhaus to contact O’Sullivan to integrate the license into the Senjo Group.  

He did this and was not further involved (EA III-1-IV, p. 53):

“I traveled to Lithuania several times and was in contact with a local law firm specializing in e-money licenses. Through this firm, I got in touch with a private individual who wanted to sell their active license. After an initial meeting, I asked Burkhard Ley and Jan Marsalek whether we shouldn't just take over the license ourselves, as it seemed like a ‘lucky buy’ to me. Burkhard Ley essentially said that with those sales figures, it wasn't worth it. Jan Marsalek told me to contact Henry O'Sullivan to integrate this license into Senjo. Henry O'Sullivan gave me a contact at Senjo to get in touch with. I handed the matter over to him and didn't become actively involved in the acquisition any further.” (Emphasis added)  

Marsalek then repeatedly asked Bellenhaus whether Finolita could be used as a processor for credit card transactions and whether Bellenhaus could arrange for a Principal Membership with Visa and MasterCard (EA III-1-IV, p. 53):

“Jan Marsalek subsequently asked me several times whether we could use Finolita as a processor for credit card transactions and whether I could help Finolita obtain a Principal Membership with Visa and MasterCard.”  

An associate membership via Wirecard Bank was also discussed, as was connection to the SWIFT network with Wirecard Bank as the correspondent bank. These topics were raised by  

Henry O'Sullivan never followed up on this when I contacted him about it. There was no response.” (Emphasis added)  

These details alone prove that the third-party partner business existed, because without actual transactions, there would have been no need for an acquirer to process them.

Almost simultaneously with the planned establishment of Finolita, the e-money institution UAB Alternative Payments was also set up. Its UBO was Wolfgang Kring, a friend of Bellenhaus (Exhibit 10.8.4.1, PDF document "63222 UAB Alternative Payments", p. 27). According to the documents, the company was registered in the State Enterprise Centre of Registers on October 21, 2014 (Exhibit 10.8.41, p. 3). UAB Alternative Payments held a payment institution license, which was granted to it by the Bank of Lithuania on September 16, 2014. This included the license for "issuing and/or acquiring payment instruments" and "money remittance" (Exhibit 10.8.4.1, PDF document "63222 UAB Alternative Payments", p. 33). UAB Alternative Payments was thus able to provide acquiring services.

This is also interesting because the couple  

This is also interesting because the Kring couple were apparently involved in the founding of Al Alam. The TPA Reality Check report states that the domain alalam-solutions.com was initially registered in 2013 by Faiz Abdid (official UBO and managing director of Al Alam) with the email address m.abdid@ala-lam-solution.com. In August 2013, the domain's email address was first changed to brian@2000charge.com, and in 2015 to brian.cheung@paymentpass.com (SoBa XIV-3 Bl. 179). Both companies belong to Wolf Kring. The company Pay-  

Incidentally, mentpass is the company that helped Bellenhaus set up the data warehouse containing the TPA data.

Bellenhaus coordinated the opening of UAB Alternative Payments' bank accounts at Wirecard Bank. Here, too, he signed off on the copies of the documents as matching the originals. Bellenhaus apparently traveled to Vilnius for this purpose. He signed the copy of the registration documents with "Original was available and matches the copy. Vilnius, March 4, 2015" (Exhibit 10.8.41, p. 20). His credit card statements show that Bellenhaus was indeed in Vilnius on March 4, 2015, and stayed overnight at the Kempinski Hotel in Vilnius (SoBa IX-1-2, p. 9). This proves that Bellenhaus was involved in setting up UAB Alternative Payments.  

According to the account opening documents, the account number 63222, held in euros, was opened, along with 10 sub-accounts with the numbers
65472
65473
65474
6547
65476
65477
65478
65479
65480
65481.  

Not a single one of these accounts has been provided so far. Instead, the public prosecutor's office has demanded a completely different account, namely account number 64500, from the insolvency administrator and included it in the...  

Files were removed. However, this clearly shows that there were payment flows on account 63222. Specifically, between December 4, 2015, and February 19, 2018, seven payments totaling €208,781.36 were received on account 64500 from account 63222. The transfer descriptions state either "Fund Transfer" or "2K settlement" plus an additional note.

Furthermore, the following is noteworthy: Transfers on account 64500 refer to PPRO Financial Ltd. in their payment descriptions. A PPRO GmbH PP is also listed in the Wirecard Merchant List.  

It is also noteworthy that on September 12, 2018, Wolfgang Kring Bellenhaus, using his UAB Alternative Payments email address, forwarded an inquiry from Raiffeisen Bank International regarding several transactions from UAB Alternative Payments account LT093530010000020002, which were allegedly canceled. He asked the banker if this was a normal inquiry, stating that the customer was "clean and well-behaved." Bellenhaus instructed the banker to respond with "bullshit bingo" (BB XXX-1-1, p. 75).